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Two Armies: Balancing America’s Landpower for Competition
and National Security
Abstract
Abstract:
The United States ground forces face divergent array of threats from a return of great
power competitors and from a continuance of irregular non-state opponents and stability
operations, leading the Army and Marine Corps to struggle with capability focuses.
American ground forces historically swing from preparing their forces for one spectrum of
conflict to the other based on immediate and perceived threats. The pendulum swing
creates uncertainty and capability gaps, requiring sharp shifts when unanticipated,
immediate threat emerge. A hybrid force model creates two distinct army groups within the
larger Army force – allowing one to focus on conventional threats, the other on irregular
war and stability operations. A compartmentalized force model divides the Army’s focus by
component, with the active component focusing on the major combat operations and the
reserve component focusing on irregular and stability conflict. A service-centric force
solution gives the Marine Corps the sole expeditionary responsibility across the spectrum
of conflict, and the Army the sustained land-based operational responsibility. The United
States land forces benefit with preparedness with a specialized two army system or service
divided responsibilities, positioning the United States ground forces to best protect the
national interests with the best prepared forces.
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Introduction
In the era of global engagement, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps face
more demanding, diverse, and complex threats across the spectrum of
conflict than any other time in its history as an all-volunteer force. The
current world environment raises serious national security concerns
ranging from the re-emergent of significant great power competitors in the
Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China, rogue nation states
such as Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Iranian Republic,
while still facing the perpetual, immediate threat of transnational terrorist
groups and the specter of irregular warfare. The U.S. Army specifically
follows a pendulum swing between organizing, training, and educating its
force structure towards one end of the spectrum or the other –
conventional threat or irregular conflict – based on its current conflict, or
preparation for the next expected war. The result is a U.S. Army and U.S.
Marine Corps forced to adapt under strain during many transitional
period when the other in an emergent conflict replaces one spectrum of
the conflict. The Army felt this as it struggled to reorient itself from a Cold
War, post-Desert Storm army to a counterinsurgency force in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and the Marine Corps returned to supporting rotational,
prolonged land-based operations.
The pendulum swing is commencing again as the return of near-peer
threats has the Army redirecting its efforts towards rebuilding a force
capable of massive, combined arms fire and maneuver against a like foe.
The Army needs to obtain a fine balance, eliminate the pivoting back and
forth, designing and supporting an overall ground force specialized,
trained, and focused to address the full spectrum of conflict without
requiring significant retraining or refocusing in the midst of a fight or
trying to catch up to a threat after specific capability atrophy. While doing
this, the balanced requirements placed on the Marine Corps must keep in
mind the Corps’ original, expeditionary, short-term land-based
operational intent.
The U.S. ground forces must build, sustain, and maintain distinct
organizational capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. A two-army
system corrects the historical imbalance. The two-army framework offers
three models: The hybrid force, the compartmentalized force, and the
service-centric force. Hybrid force model combines elements across all the
U.S. Army’s component –active, National Guard, and Reserve, while the
compartmentalized force model divides the spectrum of conflict
responsibilities among the components. The service-centric force model
divides the responsibilities between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine
Corps. Any model better prepares the United States to counter great power
competition while retaining irregular warfare and stability operations
capabilities.
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The Imbalance
During the first decade after 9/11, the U.S. ground forces focused their
energies on combating the threat of terrorism and insurgency; however,
during this time the nation’s near-peer threats advanced their military and
regional influences, emerging over the course of the decade as competitor
states in Europe and Asia. In an article relying on “nearly two years of
extensive war gaming [sic] and analysis,” RAND Corporation research
analysts in 2017 used the Russian threat to illustrate the concerning
growth of near-peer threats faced by the U.S. Army, specifically in Europe.1
With a focus on artillery and ground forces advancements, they identified
a significant Russian threat to Baltic and European allies. Between the
advancements in technology and growing experience in their own
contingency operations, the Russian competition is significant.
In comparison of U.S. artillery and Russian artillery there is a significant
range gap, with Russian artillery outranging American, providing the
Russians a maneuver and fire support advantage. Current U.S. cannon
artillery ranges are between nine to fifteen miles, while Russia’s most
common howitzer range is up to nineteen miles. United States rocket fire
reaches 25 to 44 miles depending on type of munition, while Russia fields
two rocket systems that reach ranges up to 56 miles. Russian ground
forces are armed with anti-tank munitions that penetrate even the M1
Abram main battle tank’s current armor. Facing a great power
competitor’s air force, without close supporting and coordinated air
defense and in a contested airspace, U.S. ground forces could face serious
enemy attack and losses from enemy air forces for the first time since the
Second World War.2 These disadvantages come from “a situation 20 years
in the making” from the focus on counterinsurgency and stability
operations and “will not be solved overnight,” emphasizing the initiation
of the current pendulum swing back to preparing for major conflict against
a great power competitor, a 180 degree turn from the focus on irregular
war.3
In April 2010, a frustrated U.S. Army armor officer, then-Colonel Gian
Gentile, identified aspects of the “situation 20 years in the making” and
wrote a provocative piece on “The Death of the Armor Corps.” His article
highlighted many of the issues identified with the atrophy of conventional
core competencies lost in the midst of a re-birthed counterinsurgency
focused army. His article raised pertinent questions, such as “when was
the last time a heavy Brigade Combat Team has done a combined arms,
live fire exercise integrating all arms at Brigade level?” Gentile goes on to
say, “Do the Armor, Artillery, and Infantry Branches even have the
collective knowledge to know how to do one anymore?” also highlighting
how his own cavalry squadron did not even know how to run a Bradley
Fighting Vehicle range.4
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Gentile made a bold claim in his 2010 article that “over the last 9 years of
doing irregular warfare we have eviscerated the Armor Corps to the point
of its extinction,” ending his article poignantly questioning if the U.S.
Army armor units could “pick up and head east and do a movement to
contact,” saying “Could we do it? …It will be hard to get it back. Competent
field armies, skilled in all-arms warfare, are not made overnight.5”
Likewise, a counterweight to that argument would be “if the Army does not
develop units with a COIN mindset, it will rarely find one when it’s
needed,” as demonstrated in the rough experiences and heavy costs
relearning the lessons of the Philippines, Malaya, and Vietnam during the
height of the Iraq and Afghanistan insurgencies.6 Culture and mentality
are fundamentally different if the Army decides it wants two specialized
armies rather than one jack-of-all-trades master of none, or continue the
current historical trend of accepting the painful, costly, pendulum swing.
The Struggle to Maintain Balance
The problem remains though, contrary to even the most devoted
commitment to avoid more insurgencies and stability type conflicts, that
the U.S. land forces are destined to be involved in irregular wars.
Historically, insurgencies are more common than any other type of
conflict. According to the database research of Max Boot in his work
Invisible Armies, since 1775 there have been 443 insurgencies across the
world, with nearly half of those- 202- being post-Second World War. This
gives credence to the oft-claimed irregular warfare is historically,
numerically the more common type of war, while war between states is
often more destructive but the less reoccurring. It is easy to see then how
major military organization in history have had to deal with some sort of
irregular or stability type conflict.7 What the U.S. ground forces cannot do
is what occurred post-Vietnam purging the institutional knowledge
through its reforming training, education, and doctrine after the
frustrations inherent in that war, an irregular war fought within the
confines of a Cold War peer threat focused environment.
The sentiments of officers such as Colonel Gentile echo those of the 1970s
Army post-major Vietnam drawdown. Commanders in 1971 admitted their
soldiers being combat experienced in Vietnam but ignorant of
conventional war tactics and competencies as a result. The Army
embraced the general political and public turn against counterinsurgency
and stability conflicts after Vietnam, responding with not only a refocus on
conventional warfare but also a virtually expunging of counterinsurgency
lessons and knowledge from its forces.
Both training and education emphasized this shift. The Army removed
stability operations from its basic courses, replaced all jungle and
counterguerilla training with mechanized maneuver drills, and reformed
the instruction in the U.S. Army Ranger School towards conventional
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maneuvers rather than an unconventional opponent. By 1980, the U.S.
Military Academy at West Point, the Infantry School, Command and
General Staff College, and the Army War College all had eliminated
required counterinsurgency and low-intensity conflict in their curriculum
and only a few of these institutions even offered courses on the subject at
all.
Doctrine likewise followed the trend with the publication of the Army’s
primary document Field Manual 100-5 Operations, pivoting towards
fighting the next war not the last war, and redirecting focus on the defense
of Western Europe against a Warsaw Pact opponent. The 1968 edition
removed all references to counterinsurgency and nation building, lowering
the importance of it in doctrine that retained some discussion on those
topics. It definitively influenced any subsequent doctrine published after
1976 until Generals David H. Petraeus’ and James N. Mattis’ lead in 2005
to reintroduce counterinsurgency doctrine to the mainstream doctrine.8
The U.S. Army must retain the hard lessons relearned over the last wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan and around the world in stability operations, and not
purge them from the training, education, and research and development
focused on this type of conflict. The struggle for the U.S. Army and U.S.
Marine Corps together comes from the need to prepare for the threat
exemplified by the Russian example, while still preserving the ability to
fight a sustained irregular war.

The Two Armies
A concept to maintain competency in both the large scale, peer-competitor
fights and keep a force prepared for the more common, low-intensity
irregular war and stability conflicts is to have a two army force. In an
Army-centric solution, allowing the Marine Corps to retain its current
structure and design, the Army would create two sub-armies, or army
groups, one a decisive action – conventional opponent - army and the
other an expeditionary – irregular and stability conflict – army. The
delineation allows each to remain specialized in training, education, and
doctrine, while also remaining optimally structured organizationally. As
part of the core, broader total Army, the soldiers share a base training and
education covering the full spectrum of conflict, but additionally have
more specialized focuses in training and education depending on which
army group they belonged, this giving them a common foundation but
allowing for a specialized skill set for their occupational roles.
The decisive action army would have its own force structure, with
emphasis on mechanized heavy infantry and armor formations with
concentrated fires capability. These units’ training environment would be
different from that received by the lighter expeditionary force for irregular
warfare. This decisive action force would remain largely oriented towards
major conventional threats, training in rotations focused on that enemy
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and in that operating environment. Conversely, the expeditionary oriented
force structure would consist of light and mobile forces, quickly
deployable with flexible force structure focused on counterinsurgency and
stability operations, training rotations geared towards that environment to
build those associated skills. However, a critical factor in making the
distinction would be creating the right organizational culture and fostering
the correct mentality needed for the appropriate type of conflict, whether
it is the aggressive violence in conventional conflict or that of the long
steady weight of irregular warfare. Currently the Army pivots from one
culture and mentality fostered and encouraged across the entire force to
the other depending on the environment, rather than delineating two
forces to maintain appropriate organizational orientation allowing the
Army to have two concurrently prepared focused forces.
Building, Sustaining, Maintaining Distinct Organizational Cultures
The idea of building and sustaining distinct organizational cultures for
both national security threats contributes to the case for specialized
irregular warfare force structure, because the hardest adjustments made is
not for the leaders so much as it is for the organizational culture. Having a
COIN or a stability focused organization would be no different than how
the Army already specializes units such as reconnaissance, air assault,
airborne, or mountain, making them only slightly different in structure but
significantly different in culture, specialized training focus, education, and
experience along with expectation and predictability among its members
for what they do.9 Due to their inherently full spectrum specialization,
special operation forces would remain unchanged in their orientation and
structure as they are already designed and built to fulfill their specific
requirements along the full spectrum of conflict and plug and play in
whichever type of conflict their special skill sets are required.
The new initiative of the Security Forces Assistance Brigade (SFAB) is
conceptually similar to the idea of a specialized force designed and
structured for irregular and stability operations. However, it alone is not
enough to maintain the required specialization across the force to handle
the irregular and stability threats faced by the nation. These advise and
assist type units, such as the Army’s SFAB, are a critical component in any
force structure focused on irregular and stability type conflicts. However,
these units cannot cover the whole scope of irregular warfare and require
additional various types of units to support the sort of complex
environment inherent in those conflicts. The concept of a
Counterinsurgency Brigade Combat Team – one structured, trained,
designed for contested irregular environments – is an additional force
structure change optional to the expeditionary army.10 A conceptual
employment of the expeditionary army has a light, mobile, quickly
deployable force with three elements – a strong initial entry force,
followed by a COIN Brigade for a possible insurgency and bridging the gap
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for the final advisory and assist formations to stabilize and support the
new local forces.
In contrast, the decisive action army would have its own rapidly
deployable force used to create breathing space in a conventional
confrontation with a near-peer force to give time for the larger
mobilization of the heavy forces. Upon the successful conclusion of
conventional combat operations, this force then could transition command
and control of the theater to the COIN Brigade force and then ultimately to
the advisory and assist organizations for the conclusion of the conflict. The
key in the delineation of forces is to allow the two formations to maintain
their specialized focused on their spectrum of conflict, allowing for
predictability, proficiency, and critical skill sets specifically for their
threats, avoiding difficulty and hard lessons learned by the organizations
repeatedly crossing back and forth along the spectrum.
With the delineation of two distinct armies, the capability to support each
other remains in extremis. This is a result of a common core as disciplined,
professional soldiers shared across both formations. These forces may be
specialists–conventional or irregular–for efficiency and effectiveness
purposes in their primary roles for the national defense, but they are also
capable of filling the void in each other’s wars as needed. Historically there
are examples of this sort of two-army concept and its ability to
complement each other in emergency circumstances. One example is the
massive casualties the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) as their regular
professional army experienced during the first months of the war. From
August to November 1914, the BEF lost eighty percent of their original
force, the main line regular units from Britain.11 This initiated Britain’s late
1914 to early 1915 calling up its colonial forces to fill the void left by so
many lost regulars, along with support from Britain’s traditional reserve
force of volunteers and Territorials. By 1915, the largest contingent of
these came from the Indian Army, called to France to reinforce the broken
BEF. The colonial Indian Army was over 16,000 British soldiers and
28,500 Indian soldiers who now fought on the Western Front in
conventional warfare, suffering heavily in a type of war they were not
particularly suited for but in the national emergency filled the void. Britain
was not the only one either; France tapped heavily into its African colonial
armies to balance its heavy losses across the early months of the First
World War as well, bringing in colonial troops from across Africa.12
The opposite is common as well, in certain colonial emergencies, in Africa,
Middle East, and Southwest Asia, the colonial armies were overwhelmed,
resulting in defeats that stunned the imperial power. After the colonial
armies suffered major defeats, the imperial powers would rush main line
units from the continental home country to reassert the colonial army’s
power and authority.
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The Hybrid Force Model
Two possible models to restructure the Army into specialized ground
forces are the self-contained, distinct army formations with their own slice
of the three components – active, National Guard, and Army Reserve –
and the division of responsibility among components for the different
conflicts. With the first one, the French army can serve as a conceptual
model in its delineation; however, the American model would have even
more refined skill sets. The French army in 1996 began to reinforce its
already historical division of its army with the end of the Cold War and the
identified issues with the French army in the Gulf War. Rooted in its
imperial past, the French army has had two distinct ground forces, one
designed for expeditionary use with its past as the French colonial army,
and the other against peer land threats with its past being the continental
army. They both grew and evolved in doctrine, structure, and
organizational culture in diverse paths as necessitated by the different
missions, threats, and possibilities they each faced.
The colonial army remained light, responsive, more attuned to working
with other militaries and cultures, while the larger, continental army based
in France naturally became heavier, used to responses that are
moreprescriptive, and arrayed towards long-standing identified threats.
The former colonial forces now compose lighter units, such as airborne,
marines, the Foreign Legion, and designated rapid deployment forces
from France itself, with an organizational culture of more decentralized
autonomous operations at lower echelons, higher degree of accepted risk,
and more skills in cultural knowledge. The former colonial army is now the
expeditionary army and the first to deploy to conflicts areas, but are also
permanently forward deployed across French interests, mainly throughout
West, Central, and East Africa. The metropolitan continental forces makeup the heavier armor type units and their larger infantry and support
structure, remaining in France to support the defense of Europe. The 2013
French intervention in Mali is the most recent example of the French
expeditionary army acting in relatively large numbers.13
The French army’s expeditionary force regularly deploys to forward
stations or contingency-type operations in Africa for two to three years at a
time, while the regular French army does short-term rotations of four
months at a time.14 This model is not far off from what is currently done
when it comes to assigning deployments, with the U.S. Army’s forward
presence rotations for heavy, armor units going to Europe. These units
train to face near peer threats such as those in Europe and Middle East
deterrence, while leaving the irregular and stability type warfare rotations
to the lighter forces in Africa, Pacific, and Afghanistan. However, a
difference would be the organizational focus and structure would be
changed, so that the lighter expeditionary forces would be trained and
focused and built specifically to support those irregular and stability
7
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rotations and not formed and trained to fight a conventional threat but
then be more often than not deployed to the stability or counterinsurgency
environment.
Following this concept, the decisive army group structure mirrors the lines
of the current U.S. III Corps structured as the Army’s heavy corps. Instead,
this would be an army group of majority of heavy formations across all
components, active, Guard, and Army Reserve. While the expeditionary
army structure would be more along the lines of the current U.S. XVIII
Airborne Corps and the global response force. Similar to the decisive army
group, this force structure would be larger than just the one corps, and
would have a concentration of the lighter infantry brigades, the COIN
brigades, advisory and assist formations and psychological and civil affairs
across the active, Guard, and Army Reserve formation.
The Compartmentalized Force Model
The second possible model has the two-army groups divided along
component lines, one dominated mostly by active component forces and
the other by reserve component forces. The active component forms the
decisive army, with concentration of the full force structure critical for
major combat operations against a great power competitor threat. This
force relies heavily on mechanized infantry, armor, concentrated fires
capability, and air defense with the requisite support requirements
inherent in high intensity combat. This force would be supported by
elements of the Army Reserve for required support forces to augment the
active support units. This model allows the active component forces to
focus on intensity of training and combined arms within a pure
component hierarchy to prepare for the demands of peer-competitor
combat, without the intricacies and demands of integrating part of the
combat force coming from the reserve component.
The irregular war and stability force bulk would comprise the entirety of
the Army National Guard force, with Army Reserve support augmenting
the support structure in the Guard. There is a common refrain that reserve
component soldiers are excellent choices for counterinsurgency and
stability operations inherent to their dual role for domestic support and
overseas combat operations. Between their training and experience in both
military service and their natural experiences in a civilian workforce and a
disciplined military force, they bring vastly different experiences,
knowledge, and skills to the complex environment of irregular and
stability conflicts. These dual civil and military experiences are largely
lacking in fulltime active component soldiers, or at least are rare among
them.
Another relevant factor for reserve component soldiers for shouldering the
bulk of the irregular and stability conflict load for the national defense is
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their typically longer timelines for mobilization and deployment. By the
time the reserve component ramps up support, the major conventionaltype conflict would be over, and the stability operations begun, possibly
with an insurgency depending on the specific conflict.15 The delineation
allows the active component to focus on the demanding peer-competitor
threat without its training and predictability being broken up by long and
reoccurring stability and insurgency-type conflicts, while at the same time
emphasizes in the irregular and stability force some traits inherent in the
reserve component that make it ideal for that fight.
In addition, irregular and stability conflicts are typically longer in
developing allowing for the slower reserve component mobilization
process whereas the dynamic near-peer competitor threats would rely
more on a fast active component focused response. Elements of the Guard
force, however, would still require being on a quick response spin, similar
to how some of the select units currently in the reserve component are on
a faster readiness build cycle, as these units would be required as the
initial entry forces into an irregular warfare environment. This force is
only needed if the counterinsurgency and stability force is not picking up
from a conflict transition from the decisive army but rather is leveraged in
a standalone conflict that did not develop from the conventional fight. The
predictability of long-term stability and counterinsurgency fights also
plays into the strengths of the reserve component in offering that broad
force long-term predictability in deployments and use to support reserve
component personnel and civilian life management.
As mentioned before, this would not remove the availability of the two
forces to cross support each other. In some cases, the decisive force may be
entangled in such a struggle it must call on the lighter forces in the
stability force to assist. Likewise, some insurgencies may reach critical
mass and begin to transition phases involving traditional major combat
operations and the decisive army may need to augment elements of the
stability force to address that heavier threat.
The Service Centric Force Model
A joint force solution involves the Marine Corps in an expanded capacity,
allowing it to serve as the main force for any expeditionary phases of
future conflict, without Army forces in assistance. This includes Marine
Corps taking responsibility for training, equipping, and capabilities for
decisive action, peer competition, forcible entry operations allowing for a
slower deployment of an Army heavy force structure-centric response. In
addition to this role in decisive conflict, the Marine Corps’ expeditionary
focused forces would be responsible for initial actions in an irregular or
stability type conflict until the lighter force structure-centric Army forces
deployed for follow on handoff for sustained land-based operations. This
divergent between the Marine Corps fully assuming the expeditionary and
9
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initial entry operational roles, allows the Army to focus is capability and
force structure to remain on sustained conventional conflict and long-term
stability and irregular conflict, rather than both forces dividing their force
structure in duplicated efforts.

Conclusion
The status quo is an option to address the dynamic, complex environment
in the era of global engagement, how the Army and Marine Corps swing
back and forth from one end of the spectrum to the other in drastic
response to the current or next perceived threat. This does force a refocus
on training, education, and doctrine across the entire force to increase
proficiency and preparedness towards one type of conflict. Unfortunately,
this is historically done at the expense of lessons, experience, and
proficiency of the sidelined or secondary conflict, only to switch again
when the immediacy of the contemporary threat changes. The U.S. ground
forces’ pivot addressing the emergent and present danger of irregular
warfare and stability operations post-9/11, created a historical imbalance
in the U.S. ground forces between the capabilities required for major wars
and those for irregular conflict. Meanwhile, the resurgent great power
competitors as well as rogue states increased their conventional
capabilities with modernization and growing experience, capitalizing on
the United States’ focus on irregular warfare, resulting in the growing
struggle within the U.S. ground forces over training, education, and
doctrinal focus. For the successful balance of land power in great power
competition and national security, the building, sustaining, and
maintaining of distinct organizational capabilities is imperative within the
U.S. ground forces for both types of conflict. A two-army framework
provides the requisite balance.
The two-army system has three models, two centered on reorganizing the
U.S. Army and a third joint service approach of U.S. Army and U.S. Marine
Corps. The first models create two distinct army groups within the larger
Army force – allowing one to focus on large-scale conflict, the other on
irregular war and stability operations. The hybrid force model includes
army groups distinct with their own internal support across all three
components: Active, National Guard, and Reserve. The
compartmentalized force model divides the Army by component, the
active component focusing on major combat operations against a great
power competitor and the reserve component focusing on irregular and
stability conflict. Each capable of supporting the other in crises, but
otherwise specialized in their priority conflict focus. The final servicecentric force model gives the Marine Corps the sole expeditionary
responsibility across the spectrum of conflict, and the Army the long-term
land-based operational responsibility in both decisive conflict and
irregular conflict and stability operations. In all but the status quo option,
the U.S. land forces benefit with preparedness across the full spectrum of
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conflict with a specialized two-army system or service-divided
responsibilities, with their own training, education, and doctrine specific
to their conflict focus. This balance achieved while sharing the common
core training that bonds them as disciplined, professional soldiers. With a
change to the status quo, the two Army-centric models, or service-divided
responsibilities, U.S. ground forces are positioned to protect the national
interests with the best-prepared forces.
The two army theoretical framework addresses the organizational
balancing of the U.S. ground forces in support of countering great power
competition while maintaining irregular warfare capability. The broad,
two-army framework does not address several topics beyond this work’s
scope. Further discussion should address the optimal size of U.S. land
forces for this framework, the balance of fiscal appropriation and research
efforts on modernization between the two armies, and the impact and role
of allies in this structure. Although there remains additional analysis by
strategists and decisions by policy-makers to address the imbalance of the
U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps for great power competition and
enduring irregular warfare threats to national security, a two army system
framework is a strong first step.
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